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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
E:llPLOYEES OF THE UTAH 





SIOX OF "CTAH and UTAH 
Fl!EL CO:llP .AXY, a corpora-
tion, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 6196 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
STATE:llENT OF THE CASE. 
This appeal involves certain proceedings taken and 
decision made in administering the Unemployment Com-
pensation Law of Utah, enacted at a Special Session of 
the Legislature in 1936, as amended by the Legislature 
in Regular Session of 1937. This particular incident 
designated "Employees of Utah Fuel Company at 
Clear Creek, Utah" is but one of a ~series of incidents 
which came before the Industrial Commission of Utah 
t involving the right of workers to receive unemploy-
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2 
ment compensation benefits with relation to· weeks of 
unemployment occurring during· the time that a strike 
was in existence in the bituminous coal industry of Utah. 
This rna tter in particular arises out of claims for 
unemployment compensation benefits by some of the 
Employees of the Utah Fuel Company who performed 
services in its mine at Clear Creek, Uta·h, to whom we 
shall hereinafter refer as Petitioners, with relation to a 
peri·od of unemployment ranging from midnight May 4, 
1939 to midnight May 18, 1939, which coincided in point 
of time with the above referred to strike period. 
T·he Utah Fuel Company, as the employer, appeared 
in the proceedings before the Appeals Tribunal at a hear-
ing held in Price, Utah, on July 6, 1939, is joined herein 
as a defendant and will be hereinafter designated as 
the Company. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah will be desig-
nated as the Commi,ssion. 
When the term "record" or "R'' is used it has 
reference to the file certified to this Court by the Com-
mission, and the term ''transcript'' or '' T '' refers to the 
transcript of hearing before the Appeals Tribunal at 
Price, on July 6, 1939. 
On May 19, 1939, the Commission in accordance 
with the provisions of Section 5(d) of the Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Law (Chapter 43, Laws of 
Utah, 1937) rendered a Deci,sion and Order relating to 
the conditions under which a stoppage of work had 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
occurred, involving all workers and employers in the 
bituminous coal industry of Utah, with the objective 
in mind of determining whether or not all workers fall-
ing within the grade or elass involved would be dis-
qualified fr01n receiving unemployment compensation 
benefits during the period of unemployment resulting. 
This Decision and Order was based upon an investi-
gation carried on by the Commission and arrived at the 
factual finding: 
That the terms of employment existing in the bitum-
inous coal industry throughout the United States, inelud-
ing the State of "Gtah, have customarily been determined 
by agreements entered into by and between a Union 
representing the workers, the United Mine Workers of 
.America, and the Coal Operators of the Appalachian 
Area. 
That rn accordance with such custom the workers 
and the Coal Operators of Utah have refrained from 
entering into agreements relating to the terms of em-
ployment in Utah, until the terms of an agreement in 
the Central Competitive Area have been determined. 
(Petitioners' Exhibit "B.'') 
That in the year 1937, the United Mine Workers 
of America and the Coal Operators of the Central Com-
petitive Area, had entered into an agreement which was 
to expire March 31, 1939 which, in general, fixed the 
terms of the agreement governing employment condi-
tions in the Utah bituminous coal industry except for 
items of a local nature. (Petitioners' Exhibit "A.") 
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The agreement entered into in Utah modified the 
agreement affecting the Central Competitive Area in 
that it provided for a continuation of the terms of the 
agreement pending negotiations on a new contract. (Pe-
tioners' Exhibit" A," Sec. 103.) 
That as the date for expiration of the contract 
affecting the Central Competitive Area approached, na-
tional representatives of the workers met and attempted 
to negotiate a new contract with the Appalachian Asso-
ciation of Coal Operators and because the contract of 
the Central Competitive Area provided for termination, 
endeavored to arrange an Interim Agreement whereby 
the workers could· continue to perfo-rm services under 
the terms of the old contract pending negotiations. The 
Operators of the Appalachian Area refused to enter 
into such an agreement and on April1, 1939, a stoppage 
of work o-ccurred in the Appalachian Area. 
In the State of Utah representatives of the workers, 
the United Mine Workers of America, District No. 22, 
and all of the Utah Coal Operators entered into an 
agreement whereby the terms of Section 103 above 
referred to were altered, providing for the continuation 
of operations in the Utah bituminous coal industry sub-
ject to termination upon fifteen days' written notice. 
(T. 11, 31, 32) (Petitioners' Exhibit "B.") 
That as negotiations in the Central Competitive 
Area apparently reached a deadlock the United Mine 
Workers of America, District No. 22, upon orders from 
the International Executive Board of the Union on April 
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19, 1939, issue-d a notice to the Coal Operators of Utah 
that the Interim Agreement was to be terminated and 
that a stoppage of work would be called on midnight 
of May 4, 1939. (T. 11, 39) 
The Commission, on June 12. 1939, fixed the period 
of this stoppage of work as occu1-ring from midnig·ht 
May 4, 1939 through midnight May 18, 1939. ( R. 24-25) 
Based upon its above referred to finding·s, the Com-
mission's I.kcision of May 19, 1939 rendered ineligible 
for unemployment compensation benefits, those em-
ployees of the Coal Opera tors of U tab whose grade, or 
class, or group of workers were totally or partially un-
employed due to a stoppage of work at their respective 
establishments, which existed because of the strike in 
the bituminous coal industry. (R. 1-6} 
On :May 25, 1939 a committee representing some of 
the Employees of the Utah Fuel Company, who worked 
at the mine located at Clear Creek, Utah, addressed a 
letter to the Commission protesting, in effect, that the 
unemployment of thirty-four employees had occurred 
under such special circumstances that their ·stoppage of 
work was not a result of the strike in the bituminous 
coal industry but was the result of a temporary shut-
down at the convenience of the Company. This protest 
urged, in effect, that these employees were not of a group 
•(}r class affected by the Decision of the Cominission 
rendered May 19, 1939. (R. 7-9) 
Following an investigation of the facts surrounding 
the stoppage of work occurring at the mine at Clear 
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Creek, Utah, the Unemployment Compensation Division 
rendered a Decision dated June 20, 1939 that these work-
ers were ineligible to receive unemployment compensa-
tion benefits during the strike period ranging from mid-
night May 4, 1939 to midnight May 18, 1939. (R. 26) 
On June 22, 1939 the committee representing the 
Petitioners, filed an appeal from thi~s Decision and re-
quested a hearing. After due notice to all affected 
parties a hearing was held July 6, 1939 at Price, Utah, 
on a basis of which a Decision was rendered by the 
Appeals Tribunal, dated July 11, 1939, holding that the 
Petitioners' unemployment was not due to the strike 
but due to the employer's convenience and that, there-
fore, such Petitioners were not ineligible to receive 
unemployment compensation benefits. (Decision of Ap-
peals Tribunal, R. 36-38.) 
From this an appeal was filed by the Company 
requesting a rehearing before the Commission. The 
Request for Rehearing was denied but, based upon 
all of the evidence adduced by the Appeals Tri-
bunal, under authority of Section 6(c) (Chapter 43, 
Laws of Utah, 1937) the Commission reversed the Deci-
,sion of the Appeals Tribunal and found that the Peti-
tioners were disqualified from receiving unemployment 
compensation benefits during the ~strike period. (Decision 
of Commission, August 14, 1939, R. 43-46.) 
Subsequently, a Motion for Reconsideration of the 
Commission's Decision was filed by Petitioners and was 
denied after the Commi·ssion had permitted the filing ·of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
briefs by the attorney for the Petitionefls and the attor-
ney for the t~mpany. From this Decision arose the 
Petition for "\Yrit of Review initiating this matter before 
this Honorable Body. 
ST.A.TEME~T OF FACTS. 
The Utah Fuel Company was a party to the above 
referred to .Agreement existing between the United 
Mine Workers of .America and the Utah Coal Oper-
ators -which was effective April 1, 1937 to :March 31, 1939. 
(See p. 39 Petitioners' Exhibit "A.") In contempla-
tion of its expiration a representative of the Union met 
with the Coal Operators of Utah during the latter part 
of March, 1939, and at that time entered into a Supple-
mental .Agreement whereby the terms of Section 103 
were amended and the parties agreed that the terms of 
the Wage .Agreement which was expiring March 31, 1939 
were to remain in full force and effect after March 31, 
1939 pending the negotiation of a new Wage Agreement 
and whereby the parties agreed to negotiate a new Utah 
Wage Agreement as sD'on as practicable after the nego-
tiation of a Wage Agreement by the joint Appalachian 
Conference. This Supplemental Agreement further pro-
vided that it could be terminated by either party upon 
the serving of a fifteen days' written notice. (T. 11, 31, 
32, Petitioners' Exhibit "B.") 
On April 19, 1939 the Petitioners, through their 
Union, notified the Utah Co-al Operators including the 
Company that the Interim Agreement would terminate 
at midnight May 4, 1939. (T. 11, 39) 
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In contemplation of the stoppage of work which was 
to result three steps were taken by the Company : 
First: Those workers 1performing <Services on the 
night shift which worked fro-m 7 :00 p. m., May 3, to 2 :00 
a. m., May 4, 1939, were directed at the end of their 
S'hift not to return to work on their next shift which 
would have commenced 7 :00 p. m., May 4, 1939. (T. 11, 
12, 22-29) It was customary for the miners on the night 
shift to merely mine and load the coal and leave it for 
the day shift to transport out of the mine. (T. 18) 
The Company, not desiring to have mined coal left in 
the mine during the contemplated strike, did not deem 
it convenient to have the night shift work a short shift 
which would have ended 12 :00 midnight, May 4, 1939. (T. 
55-57) 
Second: The employer developed plans for the car-
rying on ·of nonproductive construction and development 
work during the contemplated cessation of work. (T. 
40, 41) These plans carried out rproposed construction 
work in the mine which the Company had for some 
time previously contemplated and whieh it had planned 
to· carry out in the slack season which generally occurred 
in the summer months. ( T. 45) 
The construction work was to consist of remodeling 
of the tipple, the building of outside buildings, the in-
stallation of a rotary dump and belt conveyor, and 
loading rock out of and laying track in an old entry 
preparatory to the opening up of a new area in the mine. 
These extensive alterations and developments arose out 
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of the fact that the amount of coal to be mined out of 
the developed portions of the mine was eonsiderably 
red need. ( T. 6, 7, 43, 50, 59) 
Accordingly, a representative of the Company con-
tacted the Union on May 4, 1939, and requested the 
Union to give its consent to the performance of the 
above desc.ribed construc.tion work during the suspension 
of c.oal mining operations. (T. 5, 6, 40) On May 8, 1939, 
the Union gave its consent and the Company c.ommenced 
its nonproductive activities on approximately May 9, 
1939. (T. 11, 12, 18, 22) 
Third: The Company omitted the posting of a 
"work sign" whic.h was one of the c.ustomary methods 
of advising workers that the Company desired them 
to work. (T. 49) 
On May 11, 1939, a Tentative Agreement was 
reached in the Central Competitive Area by the United 
Mine Workers of Americ.a and the Coal Operators in 
the Appalachian Area. Notice of this Tentative Agree-
ment reached District No. 22 of the Union which in turn 
was submitted for approval by the Coal Operators of 
Uta:h on the ·same day. (T. 34-38) The Coal Operator·s 
of Utah approved the Tentative Agreement and sub-
mitted to and notified District No. 22 of the United Mine 
Workers of America of such approval on May 18, 1939. 
(T. 44) 
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In their brief the Petitioners, in effect, urge that the 
Decision of the Commission denying benefits is contrary 
to law and should be annulled. They contend: 
(1) T·hat there is no evidence to show that the 
Petitioners were totally unemployed due to 
a stoppage of work which existed because of 
a strike; 
(2) That if a strike existed in the coal mining 
industry there is no evidence to show that it 
was the cause or reason that the Petitioners 
became unemployed during the strike period; 
(3) That the Petitioners were unemployed due to 
the fact that the Company did not have work 
available fo-r them during the strike period. 
The defendants take the position, however, that the 
Decision of the Commission denying benefits to the 
Petitioners is correct. The defendants contend: 
1. That the question of whether or not there 
was a strike in existence was not an issue 
in the hearing before the Commis·sion and 
cannot be made one of the issues in this pro-
ceeding; 
2. That the only issue raised in the hearing be-
fore the Commission was whether or not these 
Petitioners were of the grade or class of 
workers affected by the Decision of the Com-
mis·sion rendered May 19, 1939, relative to the 
~strike existing in the bituminous coal indus-
try of Utah; 
3. That these Petitioners were of the grade or 
·class of workers affected by the Decision of 
the Commission dated May 19, 1939 due to 
the fact that their unemployment du~ing the 
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strike period did not arise out of n lack 
of work at the conYeuienoe of the employer. 
AR.GUMENT. 
I. 
THE QUESTION OF WHETHEH OR NOT THERE WAS A STRIKE 
IN EXISTEXCE AFFECTIXG EITHER THE BITUMINOUS 
COAL IXDUSTRY GENERALLY OR THE COMPANY MAY 
XOT PROPERLY BE COXSIDERED AN ISSUE BEFORE THIS 
COURT. 
A. The only issue broug-ht before the Commission 
by the Petitioners was whether or not the con-
ditions of their unemployment were such as to 
remo\e them from the purview of the Decision 
of the Commission rendered :May 19, 1939, rela-
ti\e to the coal industry strike. 
In their brief the Petitioners assert that the Find-
ings of Fact in the Commission's May 19th Decision 
cannot be taken into consideration by this court in 
rendering its decision in this matter arguing that this 
is true because no evidence was submitted by either 
party before the Appeals Tribunal relative to- the facts 
found therein. 
It is urged by them that the question of whether or 
not the Petitioners were on a strike may not have been 
properly decided as a result of proceedings from which 
this appeal is taken. (Petitioner's Brief pp. 5, 10, 22) 
We agree. The hearing before the Appeals Tribunal 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
and the Deci,sion of the Appeals Tribunal as affirmed 
by the Commission were concerned with only one ques-
tion: Were the workers performing services at the 
Clear Creek Mine of the Company separated from their 
employment because the Company desired to remodel its 
mine or because of a stoppage of work which existed 
because of a strike in the bituminous coal industry~ 
A review of the procedure required by the Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Law when claims are filed 
by unemployed individuals who may he disqualified from 
the receipt of benefits because of a stoppage of work 
due to a strike, will clearly reveal the scope of such 
hearing and decisions. (Chapter 43, Laws of Utah, 1937.) 
Section 5(d) .provides, among other things, that an 
individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for the pur-
pose of estabHshing a waiting period: 
" (d) For any week in which it is found by the 
commission that his total or partial unemploy-
ment is due to a stoppage of work which exists 
because of a strike involving his grade, class, 
or group of workers at the factory or establish-
ment at which he i~s or was last employed. 
'' ( 1) If the commission, upon investigation, shall 
find that a strike has been fomented by a worker 
of any employer, none of the workers of the grade, 
dass, or group of workers of the individual who 
is found to be a party to such plan, or agreement 
to foment a strike, shall be eligible for benefits; 
provided, however, that if the commission, upon 
investigation, shall find that such strike is caused 
by the failure or refusal of any employer to con-
form to the provisions of any law of the state of 
Utah or of the United States pertaining to hours, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
wages, or other conditions of work. such strike 
shall not render the workers ineligible for ben-
efits. 
"(2) If the commission, upon investig·ation, shall 
find that the employer, his agent, or represen-
tative, has conspired. planned, or agreed with any 
of his workers, their agents, or representatives 
to foment a strike, such strike shall not render 
the workers ineligible for benefits.'' 
Accordingly, when the Commission was apprized of 
the existence of a stoppage of work in the bituminous 
coal industry of Utah involving all miners falling within 
the purview of an Agreement existing between the Coal 
Operators of Utah and United Mine Workers of America, 
District X o. 22, it became its duty to determine whether 
or not such stoppage of work existed because of such 
strike and whether or not such strike had been fomented 
by a worker of such grade, class, or group of workers 
involved. (Petitioners' Exhibit "A.") 
The procedure followed by the Commission in 
making such determinations was that set forth in Section 
6, Chapter 43, Laws of Utah, 1937, which provides among 
other things, that: 
'' (b) . . . in any case in which the payment or 
denial of benefits will be determined by the pro-
visions of section 5(d) of this act, the deputy 
shall promptly transmit his full findings of fact 
with respect to- that subsection to the ·commission 
which on the basis of evidence submitted and such 
additional evidence as it may require, shall affirm, 
modify, or set aside such findings of fact, and 
transmit to the deputy a decision upon the iHsues 
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14 
involved under that subsection which shall be 
deemed to be the decision of the deputy. . . " 
The Commission, through its deputy, made an in-
vestigation of the circumstances surrounding the stop-
page of work existing in the bituminous coal industry. 
On May 19, 1939, without hearing, the Commi,ssion rend-
ered a Decision which held, in effect, that the stoppage 
of work existing in the bituminous coal industry of Utah 
existed because of a strike fomented by the workers 
and further held that the employees of the coal oper-
ators engaged in the production of coal in the State of 
Utah whose grade, or class, or group of workers at their 
respective establishments were totally or partially un-
employed due to such stoppage of work, were ineligible 
for benefits for such time as their total or partial un-
employment was due to such stoppage of work. The 
Decision did not relate to any particular mining company 
nor to the Petitioners. The Decision, in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 6 (b) above quoted, was deemed 
to be the Decision of the Deputy who properly notified 
all of the partie's, including the Petitioners. (R. 1-6) 
On May 25, 1939, the Petitioners, through a com-
mittee, addressed a communication to the Commission 
asserting in effect that the circumstances under which 
t·he work of the Petitioners terminated were such that 
their unmeployment, either total or partial, did not fall 
within the purview of the May 19th Decision of the Com-
mission. It did not question the propriety of the Com-
mission's Deci,sion relative to the reasons for the stop-
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page of work, i. e.. a strike fomented by the workers. 
(R. 7-9) 
An investigation was conducted by the Commission 
as to the reasons for the stoppage of work at the Clear 
Creek mine of the Company "ith the objective of learn-
ing whether or not such stoppage arose out of the desire 
of the Company to remodel its mine. This investigation 
culminated in a decision dated J nne 20, 1939 which held, 
in effect. that the Petitioners were ineligible to receive 
unemployment compensation benefits during the strike 
period May 5. 1939 to May 18, 1939, inclusive. In other 
words, the Petitioners in this Decision were found to be 
of the grade, class, or group of workers involved in the 
stoppage of work which existed because of the strike in 
the bituminous coal industry. (R. 26) From this Deci-
sion the Petitioners filed an appeal on June 22, 1939. 
(R. 27) Again, it is pointed out that there was no 
appeal from the May 19th Decision of the Com-
mission. As a result ·of this appeal the hearing on 
July 6, 1939, was held. This hearing was concerned 
solely with the question of whether or not the peti-
tioners' unemployment was the result of a cessation of 
employment because of the Company's desire to remodel 
its plant. 
The opening and closing discussions appearing in 
the transcript of the hearing forcibly brought out the 
issues with which the parties were concerned: 
''THE EXAMINER: We will let the record 
show that claims have been filed by the employee-s 
of the Utah Fuel Company working at the mine 
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at Clear Creek, Utah for unemployment compen-
sation benefits, and that between the dates begin-
ning midnight May 4, 1939 and ending May 18, 
1939 the Benefit Section of the Unemployment 
Compensation Division disqualified these men on 
the ground that they refused to accept employ-
ment when offered and that such refusal was due 
to a strike which existed at the coal mine. The 
claims of the men in filing their appeal with the 
Appeals Tribunal are to the effect that they were 
available for the work that was being done at the 
coal mine, and at that time the tipple was being 
remodeled, and I guess it is probably going to be 
the claim of the men that no suitable employ-
ment was available to them and that the posting 
of the work sign by the company was not done 
in good faith. Is that true~ 
''MR. GIBSON: No. We claim that no work 
sign was posted. 
''THE EXAMINER: In view of the fact 
that an appeal was filed by the employees, we ask 
that the employees present their evidence first. 
''MR. GIBSON: Let me ask a question right 
here. Maybe we can shorten the matter. The 
question of the statement, on the ground for re-
fusal is the only question involved, isn't it~ In 
other words, is the Utah Fuel Company making 
any other claim other than the one stated by Mr. 
Atkin~ 
"MR. BINCH: The position of the Utah 
Fuel Company is that on April nineteenth we re-
ceived notice t·hat the contract existing between 
the coal operators and the United J\1.ine Workers 
would terminate on midnight on May fourth and 
that no additional work would be done under that 
union contract until some further agreement had 
been entered into. And that on the fifth the men 
were not at work simply because they had chosen 
to stay away. 
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• • THE EXAMINER: Yon nrc, however, tak-
ing the position, Mr. Binrh. that work was avail-
able to the men if thev eared to return to the work 
at the coal mine. • 
"'MR. BIXCH: No. "\York would have been 
available if they had wanted to dig· coal, but 
it was not available to all of them for this out-
side activity. 
"THE EXAMIXER: "\Yell, that is what I 
am referring to-the prOtiuction of coal. vV ork 
would ha\e been available to them. 
"'MR. BINCH: I don't know that it is ma-
terial what our attitude in that case would be. 
The mine recei\ed notice that they would term-
inate their contract and would not work. What 
our attitude might have been after that doesn't 
enter the picture as I see it. 
"MR. GIBSON: Well, the reason I asked 
the question is, I didn't want to introduce a lot of 
evidence to prove something that might not be 
in the contro\ersy. 
''THE EXAMINER: Surely. 
"MR. GIBSON: I think I understand the 
matter now. There isn't any contention between 
us other than the reason the men didn't work 
was because of the termination of the contract 
and the notice that you have described." (T. 2, 3) 
* * 
''THE EXAMINER: And go in to it a little 
more thoroughly to establish whether work was 
available or not. In other words, if there had 
existed any disagreement between the operators 
and the miners, was work available in that event~ 
and was the stoppage of work due to the refusal 
of the men to go to work or was it due to the 
company's inability to operate the mine~ 
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"MR. BINCH: I will state here, I don't 
intend to offer any evidence as to the rela~ion­
ship between the sales department and the mines. 
We are going to stand on that notification that 
they weren't going to work. 
''THE EXAMINER: I see. All right then, 
we will consider the hearing closed, and we will 
mail a written decision to the interested parties." 
(T. 68, 69) 
* * * * * * * 
''THE EXAMINER: Just a moment, Mr. 
Binch. Would the parties be willing to enter 
into a stipulation that in the event that the special 
circumstances surrounding the unemployment of 
these claimants as claimed by the representative 
of claimants, do not apply, would it be agreeable 
to bind both of the parties by the facts sub-
mitted, the evidence submitted in the large hear-
ing in which Mr. Senior is representing the Utah 
Coal Producers Ass,oeiation and Mr. Gibson is 
representing the United Mine Workers. In that 
hearing, of course, we will go into that question 
completely, why the stoppage of work, what was 
the reason for the stoppage of work, and oonnect 
it up with the Appalachian agreement or nego-
tiations in the Appalachian Area. 
"MR. BINCH: That will be quite all right 
with me. 
"THE EXAMINER: That is agreeable to 
you? 
''MR. GIBSON: In t,his case, Mr. Atkin, I 
believe it is such a special case, I don't see how 
it could be decided by the other one. Of course, 
I see if you decide against these men on this, they 
have the other legal question which would be 
decided in the main one. I am willing to go part 
way. I don't want to be prejudiced in this case. 
Suppose you decide against us on this case, I 
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want to appeal on tlw merits of this ensC' alone 
and not he bound by the facts of this other cas(_~, 
because I believe I have a reeord here that entitles 
these men to compensation, and I don't ·want to 
take a chance of hurting my record by some other 
mine. It is all right with me that no appeal be 
taken until the other case is decided, but of 
course I don't want to be prejudiced by the time 
of the appeal running. 
• ·MR. BIXCH: I didn't get that. 
··MR. GIBSOX: 'Yell, suppose they decide 
this ease no\\ and decide it against us, my time 
for appeal starts to run. 
'':MR. BIXCH: Yes. 
'':MR. GIBSON: All right, suppose they 
don't decide the other case for sometime, and you 
want me to wait on this case to appeal it until 
the other one is decided. My time for appeal 
will expire before the other one is decided. I will 
be willing to wait provided you will stipulate that 
the time for appeal doesn't begin to run until that 
case is decided." (Italics are ours.) (T. 69, 70) 
At no time during the hearing was an issue made 
of the propriety of the Commission's Decision of May 
19, 1939, that the stoppage of work existing in the bitum-
inous coal industry was the result of a strike fomented 
by the workers. 
This is borne out by the fact that the Decision of 
the Appeals Tribunal, rendered July 11, 1939, subsequent 
to the above referred to hearing, came to the conclusion 
that: 
" . . . the unemployment of the claimants 
herein involved was due to a lack of suitable em-
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ployment, which condition was not brought into 
existence by or which had any connection with a 
stoppage of work due to a strike at X Company's 
coal mine at Clear Creek, Utah, within the mean-
ing of section 5 (d) of the U tab Unemployment 
Compensation Law.'' (R. 36-38) 
Upon an appeal by the Company from the Decision 
,o.f the Appeals Tribunal the Commission rendered its 
Decision of August 14, 1939, in which the scope of the 
decision was limited again to the question of whether 
or not the petitioners' unemployment arose under such 
circumstances as to take them out of the purview of the 
decisions of the CommissiCl,n relative to the general strike 
situation dated May 19, 1939 and June 22, 1939, respect-
ively. 
We quote the following language: 
''From the facts submitted in this case it appears 
quite clearly that the X Company would not have 
con1menced its repair and alteration activities 
until later in the summer. On the contrary, it 
appears quite clearly that repairs and alterations 
occurring in the mine from May 9 to May 18 and 
thereafter, were of a nature that had the stop-
page ,of work terminated, the Mining Company 
could quite readily have commenced operations 
in the regular production of coal, in fact, it ap-
pears that until tipple repairs were commenced 
approximately one month after May 9 the mine 
did not require any great time in which to resume 
the normal production -of coal. \V e do not believe 
that this constitutes a circumstance taking these 
claims out of the scope of the determinations of 
May 22 and June 17, relative to the general strike 
situation in the bituminous coal industry.'' (R. 
43-46) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
It is even doubtful that the petitioners in their 
Petition for 'Yrit of Re\iew. filed before this Honorable 
Body, clearly raised the issue of whether or not the 
stoppage of work existing in the bituminous coal indus-
try was a result of a strike fomented by the workers. 
The issue does not become clearly stated until the Brief 
of PetitiDners was filed. Even t,here, the Brief of Peti-
tioners does not particularly raise the issue of whether 
or not there is a strike but questions the propriety 
of this c.ourt to renew the Findings of Fact of the 
Commission in the D€cision of May 19, 1939, issued 
by the Commission relative to the strike. It is 
our contention that the court should limit the scope 
of its review of this proceeding to the issue of: Whether 
or not the circumstances under which the unemployment 
of the petitioners occurred were such as to remove them 
from the purview of the Commission's strike decision. 
Our position is in accord with such a widely accepted 
tenet of law that extensive argument on the point ap-
pears unnecessary. Generally speaking, the parties may 
not alter the issues or theory of a case upon appeal to the 
reviewing court. They must, remain within the issues 
raised in the lower court and upon which evidence was 
adduced. 
In the case ·of Wihite Company v. Bragg, 273 S. W. 
7, the Supreme Court of Arkansas refused to permit the 
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plaintiff to introduce a new issue upon which it sought to 
reverse the Trial Court and said: 
''This question was not made an issue in the Trial 
Court by the pleadings, testimony and instruc-
tions of ·the Court. It is well settled in this State 
that a party cannot on appeal contend for a theory 
of the case different from that which it contended 
for in the Trial Court.'' 
In the case of Western Indemnity Company v. State 
Industrial Commission, 219 P. 147, Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma, said with reference to the same principle: 
''Where a party tries his case upon one theory 
in the Trial Court, he will not be permitted to 
ehange in this Court and prevail upon another 
theory and issue not presented to the Trial Court." 
See also Southern Insuramce Company v. Hastings, 41 
S. W. 1093; Shi!WJ~ v. Plott Newport & Co., 101 S. W. 742 
(Ark.); Newsome v. Fleming, 181 S. E. 393. 
This principle of law has been quite universally ap-
plied to cases invo.lving appeals from de-cisions made by 
administrative tribunals to a court of review. 
In the case of Ujeviah v. Inspiration Consolidaled 
Copper Co., 33 P. (2d) 599, the Supreme Court of Ari-
zo.na refused to permit the appellant to raise an issue be-
fore it which he had failed to raise before the Commis-
sion in a workmen's compensation case. The Court said: 
''In his motion for rehearing :he made no such 
.complaint. In fact, the record shows he seemed 
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to acquiesce in the method pursued. This point 
having not been urged before the Commission 
romes too late." 
So too, the Supreme C()urt of Michigan in another work-
men's eompensation case, Doherty v. Grosse Isle TP, 172 
N. W. 596, said: 
"The daim that Doherty was a casual employee 
was concededly not properly raised before the Ac-
cident Board nor passed upon by it. . the 
question of ea.sual employment is not properly 
here for review '' 
See also Burmester L DeLucia, 189 N. E. 231, Court of 
Appeals, New York. 
This principle has been followed in Utah with rela-
tion to matters arising under the Workmen '·s Compensa-
tion Law before the Industrial Commission of Utah. It 
is not as strictly applied in proceedings arising from ad-
ministrative tribunals as from trial courts, but never-
theless, generally speaking, parties cannot present one 
set of issues before an administrative tribunal a.nd later 
ask for a reversal of the tribunal's decision upon the basis 
of some new issue. 
This Court in the case of Stanley v. Industrial Com-
mission of Utah, 8 P. (2d) 770, said: 
"Rule that pertains to the Courts to the effect that 
parties cannot try a case on one theory and then 
attempt to gain a reversal upon some other theory 
on appeal not advanced on the trial should not be 
applied as stri-ctly to the Industrial Commission, 
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especially if the parties were honest and were not 
experimenting with the Tribunal, since the In-
dustrial ·Commission has a duty to determine 
whether the 0onditions precedent exist w.hich en-
title an applicant to payment, regardless of 
theories advanced by counsel.'' 
The immediate case, however, does not even fall 
within the purview ·of the above quoted liberal opiniorn 
of the ·court. It should 1be noted that the issue of whether 
or not the stoppage ·Of work \Vas due to a strike was 
known to be in existence to all of the parties, including 
the Petitioners, and that there was an intentional rather 
than an inadvertent failure to pursue su~h issue in the 
hearing before the Appeals Tribunal. There is no doubt 
that the above referred to principle of law should prevent 
the raising of this new issue by the Petitioners even 
though this is an appeal from an administrative tri-
bunal. 
Unless the court accedes to this viewpoint it would 
find itself in the position ·of rendering a decision upon 
the issue of whether or not the stoppage of work was due 
to a strike fomented by the workers without sufficient 
evidence because, as a matter of fact, in this proceeding 
there was no thorough investigation of the reasons for 
the stoppage ·Of work existing in t:he bituminous coal in-
dustry or for that matter of the reasons for the stoppage 
of w·ork at the ·Clear ·Creek mine of the Company. 
The Commission had fulfilled its duty with reference 
to determining whether or not payments should be made 
out of the Unemployment Compensation Fund to all 
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wDrkers inYolved in the stoppagp of work by rendering 
a separate decision after n separate investigation on 
May 19, E)39. 
II. 
THE COMMISSION REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE PETITIONERS' 
LNEMPLOYMENT OCCURRED WERE NOT SUCH AS TO 
REMOVE THEM FROM THE PURVIEW OF ITS GENERAL 
STRIKE DECISIONS OF MAY 19, 1939, AND JUNE 22, 1939. 
In determining whether or not any claimant for bene-
fits must be considered as disqualified be~ause the cir-
cumstances surrounding his unemployment fall within the 
purview of Section 5(d) aho\e quoted, it is essential that 
the Commission satisfy- itself as to two points: 
(1) Was there a stoppage of work in existence 
at the worker's establishment due to a strike 
fomented by and involving his grade, class, 
or group of workers? 
(2) Was the claimant's unemployment due to 
such stoppage of work¥ 
As urged by us above, point No. 1 was determined by the 
Commission in another proceeding not here under re-
view and with relation to all the workers and operators 
of the bituminous coal industry of Utah. The circum-
stances under which petitioners' employment terminated 
will determine point No. 2. 
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Were they such that the Commission should reason-
ably have found that Petitioners' unemployment was 
traceable to some ·other cause? What caused the Com-
pany to cease operations at the Clear Creek mine? Was 
it a desire. to remodel its mine? 
A review of the evidence indicates that during the 
period immediately preceding May 4, 1939, it was carry-
ing on mining operations very much as usual for that 
time of the year. Although the Company generally fa.ced 
a decrease in the volume of its business during the sum-
mer months; it was continually receiving and anticipat-
ing sufficient -orders to have pr·oduced some coal during 
this period. (T. 50-53) 'There is no testimony which in-
dicates that the Company would have closed its 
mine on May 4, 19•39, because of lack of business. As a 
matter of fact, it appears that the contrary was true; that 
customers of the Con1pany advised ·O.f the contemplated 
stoppage of work, due to a strike, were notified that no 
orders could be filled during its existence. (T. 48, 49) 
The facts are that the first step taken, which culmi-
nated in the stoppage of coal pr·oduction at the Clear 
Creek mine, was taken by the workers in the form of a 
notice that the Interim Agreement (Petitioners' Exhibit 
'' B '') would be cancelled. That notice caused a cessation 
of productive work on midnight May 4, 1939. (T. 11) 
The facts thus far recited justify the ·Commission's 
decision that the unemployment .of the petitioners did not 
arise from circumstances other than the strike. 
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The actions of the Company, after not ifi{•a tion that 
work would cease on May 4, 1n3~l, quite dearly are the 
actions which the Petitioners are now urging as the causes 
f-or the stoppage of work. The Company's first act was 
to bring to fruition a plan of nonproductive work such 
as remodeling and extension of the mine during the con-
templated stoppage of work period. On May 4, 1939 it 
met with a Union official seeking his consent to perform 
such nonproductive work and to use its former workers 
if possible. Only after such permission· was given by the 
representative of the Petitioners on May 8, 19·39, did the 
Company actually commence operations. 
Does the fact that an employing unit seeks to con-
tinue operations, not in conflict with the desires of the 
striking workers, constitute a factor which removes the 
workers from the purview of Section 5(d) of the Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Law~ We think not. Sec-
tion 5(d) is concerned with the reasons for the termina-
tion of the workers' employment. 
A close analogy to the factors decisive ·of this ques-
tion would be the tort theory of ''Proximate Causa tiDn. '' 
The Company's desire to. remodel its plant does not alter 
the fact that the "proximate cause" of the Petitioners' 
unemployment was their desire to forward the negotia-
tion of a work agreement favorable to. themselves. 
It was urged by the Petitioners that the Clear Creek 
mine could not :have operated because there was a lack 
of coal. The evidence clearly indicates that such was not 
the case. (T. 43, 50, 59, 66) The testimony was that the 
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Clear Creek mine was ·ornly "sixty per cent worked out," 
so that if a stoppage of work had not existed the said 
Clear Creek mine could have and would have operated. 
Inquiry as to the .character of such nonproductive 
enterprise, with the ·nbjective of determining whether or 
not such nonpr·oductive enterprises would have prevented 
a return to a production of coal, clearly indicates that it 
was not ne·cessary to stop coal production while doing 
the development work. (T. 43, 66) As a matter of fact, the 
only alteration of the Company's equipment which could 
have prevented pr·oduction was an alteration of the tipple 
which did not occur until approximately thirty days after 
the stoppage of work ·commenced. (T. 51, 66) 
T:he decision ·of the· Company to engage in such non-
pr·oductive work could not reasonably have been con-
sidered an indication that it desired to terminate opera-
tions at the Clear Creek mine. The testim.ony adduced at 
the hearing indicates that the decisi·on to stop production 
of coal was not made at the time that the decision to do 
development work was made. ( T. 46, 65, 66) The develop-
ment work had been contemplated several months previ-
ous to May 4, 1939, and was planned to take place some-
time during the summer months. 
As a matter of fact, the 'Company did not even con~ 
template commencing nonproductive work until it had 
met with representatives of the Petitioners and had se-
cured their consent to carry ·on such activities during the 
strike period. (T. 5, 6, 8, 1·5, 16) 
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The Petitioners additionally urged that once the 
Company determined upon a course .of nonproductive 
work and made such work available to some workers at 
the Cl-ear Creek mine the workers not offered sueh em-
ployment became immediately eligible to receive unem-
ployment compensation benefits. They seemed to have 
reasoned that there was an insufficiency of "suitable" 
employment offered. This reasoning is based upon a dis-
tortion of th-e facts in order to prevent the disqualifica-
tion of the workers under the provisions of Section 5(d) 
(Chapter 43, Laws of rtah, 1937) and to make it appear 
that the Petitioners may not be disqualified because of 
the ·pronsions of .Section 5 (c) which bases disqualifica-
tion upon the refusal of workers to ac.cept '~ suitruble 
w<>rk" when offered. They, in effect, urge that work at 
the Clear Creek mine looking to the production of coal 
was "unsuitable" within the provisions of Section 5 (c) 
(2) which provides that: 
"(2) Notwithstanding any other provisions of 
this act, no work shall be deemed suitable, and 
benefits shall not be denied under this act to any 
otherwise eligible individual for refusing to ac-
cept new work under any of the following condi-
tions: (a) If the position offered is vacant due 
directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dis-
putes ; * * ~ " 
It appears to be the Petitioners' position that the 
only "suitable work'' was the nonproductive employment 
engaged in by the Oo.mpany and that the Company was 
offering an insufficient amount of such work. The posi-
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tion taken by the Petitioners, if acceded to, would con-
stitute an evasion of the provisions of Section 5(d). The 
employment of the Petitioners was in existence prior to 
May 4, 1939; their work was the production of coal. The 
Petitiom.ers ended that employment by issuing a notitee 
that effective May 4, 1939, they would abrogate the In-
terim Agreement. (Petitioners' EX'hibit "B.") 
Certainly, the nonproductive work that the Company 
offered was "suitable" within the purview of Section 
5 (c) of the Law but it was not the ·only "suitable work" 
offered. Production ·Of coal was refused by the workers 
and the circumstances under which they refused it were 
the same circumstances which caused it to. become "un-
suitable" in the eyes of Petitioners. If so deemed, all 
work refused by strikers would have to be considered 
"unsuitable" and, therefore, all strikers could claim 
benefits because they had not been offered "suitable" 
employment. 
Section 5(c) was intended to render "unsuitable,'' 
work available due· to a strike only with relationship to 
workers not of the striking group or class, and Section 
5( c) shoruld not be .considered the section applicable to 
the determination .of the benefit rights of these Peti-
tioners. It, therefore, seems to be obvious that the Com-
pany need not have been in a position to offer nonpro-
ductive work to all of the workers at the Clear Creek 
mine in order to have continued their disqualification 
from bene-fits with'in the purview ·of the strike decision 
of the Commis-sion dated May 19, 1939. 
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Petitioners assert n fu1iher g-round whereby the 
workers must be deemed clig-iblt"' t{) l'l'<.'l"'iYc unemploy-
ment compensation benefits during· tlw ~trike ,•period. 
They state at Page 10 (Brief of Petitioners) : 
., The Ftah Fuel Company dtW8 not cn'n elaim 
that the mine "·ould haYe worked so nnwh that 
the men would not haYe been entitled to partial 
unemployment compensation as is the effed of 
the present decision of the commission.'' 
Is it necessary~ to the disqualification of 1.vorkers 
"Whose unemployment is due t.o a stoppage of work re-
sulting from a strike, that the Commission find that the 
"Workers would haYe •been totally employed by the em-
ploying unit if the stoppage of work had not occurred~ 
We call your attention to the language of Section 
5(d) pronding that an individual shall be ineligible for 
benefits. Such disqualification applies: 
"(d) For any week in which it is found by the 
commission that his total or partial unemployment 
is due to a stoppage of work which exists 
because of a strike involving his grade, class, or 
group of workers * * *. '' (Italics are ours.) 
Even if the evidence unquestionably indicates that the 
mine would have worked only one day in each of the 
weeks involved in the strike period the Petitioners would 
have been disqualified' from the receipt of unemployment 
compensation benefits for the entire period. If their 
partial unemployment is due to the stoppage of work it 
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is sufficient. The language .of the law is so clear that 
further argument would be useless. 
Petitioners make much of the fact that t:he Company 
omitted to post ·'"work signs'' o·r in any other manner 
advise the Petitioners to work during the strike period. 
At page 8 (Brief of Petitioners) they urge: 
''The defendant's superintendent in Clear Creek 
testified on cr.oss examination that the men were 
not asked at any time to work and did not at any 
time refuse to work.'' 
On Page 10 (Brief of Petitioners) they assert: 
''All of the evidenc.e submitted by ho.th sides shows 
that no offer of work during the period in ques-
tion was made to the petitioners and that tbey did 
not refuse to accept any wo.rk and could not have 
refused because none was offered.'' 
And, ·On Page 13 (Brief of Petitioners) they contend: 
''The evidence is conelusive that no work sign 
was put ·OUt notifying the men to ·Come to work 
at any time after May 4 as had he en the custom 
of the company.'' 
This argument appears t·n be making considerable 
of a mere technicality and fails to face the reality of the 
facts presented in the evidence, i.e., that tlhe men took 
the initiative and notified the ·Company that there would 
be no work after May 4. In fact, Petitioners' argument 
if f.oHowed, would result in a requirement that the Com-
pany refuse to reco~gnize the workers' right to strike and 
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t.h) 
would in fact require the Company to mnke an effort to 
work its nline in opposition to the workers' desire to. 
create a stoppage of work as a method of furthering any 
collecti\e bargaining on which they may embark. 
P~rha·ps the best reply that can be made to this as-
sei1ion of the Petitioners was that given by Mr. Bryson, 
a witness f.or the Company, to the question: 
"Q. \\hy wasn't it posted~ 
''A. \\ e accepted the official notice of the mine 
workers at its face value and felt that it 
would be technical and useless and not in 
good faith to post it." (T. 49) 
It is disclosed by the evidence that a portion of the 
Petitioners were employed on the night shift which shift 
commenced at 7:00p.m. and ended 2:00a.m. of the fol-
lowing morning. As has !been previously pointed out, 
the night shift was engaged entirely in the mining of coal 
but would leave its transportation out of the mine to the 
following shift. Consequently, when the Company was 
advised that a stoppage of work was to ·occur, effective 
midnight of 1Iay 4, it notified the men <m the night shift 
that they would not be required to work at the next shift. 
The Company did not deem it advisable to have 
this shift work a short shift ending at midnight May 4, 
because it did not want its coal left in the mine during 
the proposed strike period. ('T. 55-57) 
Was the fact, that the employment of those Petition-
ers who worked ·on the night shift was terminated in ad-
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vance of the time set by t:he Union for the general stop-
page of work, a circumstance which would remove such 
portion of the claimants ·out ·Of the purvimv of the Com-
mission's strike decision of May 19? 
If we may be penni tted to again use the terminology 
''proximate cause'' and our analogy to that tort doctrine 
it appears to be quite clear that the unemployment of 
such claimants was still a result of the stoppage of work 
due to the· strike. 
The determination of t:1e Compa·ny to suit its con-
venience as to the time of the cessation of their work 
with respect to the time of the proposed stoppage ·Of work 
was not the "proximate cause'' of their unemployment. 
In fact, the termination of their employment at 2 :00 a.m. 
on the morning of May 4, 1939 was as much a result of 
the strike notice as the termination of t1he later shift at 
3 o'clock p. m., that day. The mere matter of a few hours 
should not be oonsidered as altering the reason for such 
termination. 'To follow any other reasoning would re-
sult i·n denying to an employing unit a. reasonable op-
portunity to arrange the affairs of its business to eomply 
with the very thing desired by its striking workers-a 
complete cessation .of w·ork during the bargaining period. 
\Vhen the Utah law refers to unemployment which 
is due to a stoppage of work it does not limit such unem-
ployment to that which ooincides with the time .of the 
stoppage of work; it merely seeks to identify the unem-
ployment in terms of its causa;tion. The in1portant ques-
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tion is not: "\Yhen did thP unemployment Ol'C.nr'?-lmt 
Why did the unemployment OC('Ur'! 
It is our position that the nnemploymt~nt of the Peti-
tioners on the night shift was a result of the stoppag-e 
of work found to exist by the strike decision of the Com-
mission dated May 19, 1939. 
III. 
EVEN IF THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE STOPPAGE 
OF WORK WAS I~ E..."TISTENCE BECAUSE OF A STRIKE 
FOMEXTED BY THE WORKERS IS CONSIDERED THERE 
IS SUFFICIE~""T EVIDE.J.'lCE TO SUSTAIN A FINDING BY 
THE COMMISSIOX THAT THE STOPPAGE OF WORK WAS 
DUE TO A STRIKE FOMEKTED BY THE WORKERS. 
In determining whether or not Petitioners for bene-
fits under the "Gtah unemployment compensa.tion law 
should be disqualified because ·of the provisions of Sec-
tion 5(d) above quoted, it booomes incumbent upon the 
Commission to determine when the total or partial unem-
ployment under oonsideration is due to a stoppage of 
work: 
(1) Whether or not the stoppage of work is due 
to a strike involving the grade, class or group 
of workerS' filing claims ; and, 
(2) Whether or not such strike has been foment-
ed by any worker of such grade, class, or 
group of workers. 
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A strike has been defined quite generally as an act 
of quitting work: 
'' * * * such an act done by mutual under-
standing by a body of workmen as a means of en-
f.or·cing compliance with demands made on their 
employer; a stopping of work by workmen in 
·O<rder to obtain or resist a change in conditions of 
employment.'' Webster's New International Dic-
tiona.ry, Second Edition, Unabridged. 
In the case of Restful Slipper Company v. United 
Shoe & Leather Union, 17 4 A. 543, the Chancery Court 
of New Jersey, said: 
''A strike is cessation of work by employees in an 
effort to get for the employees more desirable 
terms.'' 
Was there sufficient e'Vidence presented during the 
hearing of July 6, 1939, to reasonably support any find-
ing by the Commission that the stoppage of work in the 
bituminous coal industry and more particularly at the 
Clear Creek mine of the Company was due to a strike~ 
We urge that the pr·o1of is positive and uncontra-
dicted that work ceased at midnight May 4, 1939, as a 
result of a strike and for no other reason. There is Peti-
tioners' Exhibit "A'', the Agre·ement !between the Unit-
ed Mine Workers of America, District No. 22, and the 
Uta1h Goal Operators, to~ which the Petitioners and the 
Company were· parties and which by its terms expired 
March 31, 1939. 'There is Petitioners' Exhibit "B ", the 
Extension of Agreement to which the Petitioners and the 
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Company were parties, agreeing that wDrk should con-
tinue after March 31, 1939, but. subject t01 termination on 
fifteen days' notice. 
A perusal of the Extension Agreement quite clearly 
indicates that such agreement related to working· condi-
tiDns and wages of the Petitioners: that there were nego-
tiations pending whereby a new wage agreement was 
being sought; and that fhe Petitioners as well as the 
Company agreed to negotiate a new Utah "\Vage Agree-
ment as soon as the negotiations in the Joint Appalachian 
Omference had been concluded. 
There is the positive statement by the General Su-
perintendent of the Company that notice of termination 
was given by the Union, "* * * formal notification 
frDm the union authorities, written notification, that work 
would terminate.'' (T. 39) 
If corroboration were needed Mr. Carey, official of 
the union and representative ·Of the Petitioners, unre-
-servedly made the admission that notice was served that 
the temporary ·Contract, the Extension of Agreement, 
would terminate at midnight ~fay 4, 1939, and the further 
admission that all productive work in the mine ceased by 
reason ·of that order or notice at midnight May 4, 1939. 
(T. 11) 
All of the elements necessary to constitute proof o.f 
a strike are clearly in ·evidence. There was an act of 
quitting work done by mutual understanding lby the work-
men as a body; such act was a means to obtain a change 
in conditions of employment. 
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Did the Commission reas·onably conclude that the 
strike was fomented by the workers~ 
The word'' f·oment'' is defined as: 
''' * * * to ·cherish or promo1te the growth of, 
by excitements; t·o rouse; encourage, instigate." 
Webster's New ln1ternational Dictionary, Second 
Edition. Unabridged. 
The word "foment" as used in Section 5(d) does 
not merely refer to a creation of the eonditions of unrest 
which conclude in a strike but refers to the act of striking 
such as t·he issuance of a notice and the cessation of work 
upon such notice. The Commission's determination as 
to whether or not there was a. fomentation of a strike is 
concerned not with determining whether or not the em-
ploying unit may 1have brought ahout the unrest which 
resulted in the strike but is concerned with determining 
what group ·Or class ·of workers were party to the strike 
by participating in the act of quitting upon mutual under-
standing. 
S.ectiorn '5(d) is concerned with the preventing of the 
use of the Unemployment Compensation Fund for pur-
poses ·Of financing a stoppage of work br•ought about by 
the wo•rkers' determination to use that weapon of laihor 
called the ''strike.'' 
A r·eview of the testimony appHaring in the Tran-
·Sc:ript of the Hearing of July 6, 1939, clearly indicates 
that the act of quitting work was the result of thH mutual 
determination of the Petitioners. (T. 11, 59') 
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It is urged by Petitioners that ber~1use the determina-
tion to terminate the Interim Agreement was made by 
the Central Oonnnittee of the United Mine Workers of 
Ameriea, the Petitioners had no voiee in the matter. They 
assert, "They were ordered. to do so by their Interna-
tional Exeeutive Board apparently beeause of the dead-
loek in the Central Competitive Area.'' 
The writers of this brief do not pose as authorities 
op the proeedure of the United Mine Workers of Amer-
ica. The -organization is nation-wide and according to 
the National Labor R~lations Board, the sole bargaining 
agency for all coal miners in the United States. We as-
sume that it is demoeratic in its organization. We know, 
in a general way, that their conventions are composed of 
a great many delegates from Local unions all over the 
United States, at which are elected officers and general 
plans are formulated. Prior to the termination of one 
labor -contract and before negotiations are begun for 
another, the Union Scale Connnittee in charge of such 
negotiations, meets to determine the demands to be made 
and the course of action to be followed in securing a new 
contract embodying the terms sought. Apparently, mem-
bers of the United Mine Workers of America delegate to 
their ·officers practically unlimited powers and authority 
for the conduct of negotiations, and have vested a group 
of men with full authority to act as shall, in their judg-
ment, seem to the best interests of the memhers. 
A complaint from the members that their delegates 
acted ·contrary to their wishes or without further con-
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sulting their desires falls rather flat. They, of their own 
volition, pla.ced themselves within the powers of their 
repres·entatives and it eomes with rather bad grace to 
later attempt to hide behind the skirts ·Of innocence and 
helplessness. 
At Page 18 (Brief of Petitioners) Petitioners raise 
a rather novel question. We quote: 
''·The next question to be considered is whether 
or not employees who have a contractual right 
with their employer to terminate a .contract upon 
certain conditions become ineligible for unemploy-
ment compensation by doing only w:hat their em-
ployer has contractually agreed with them that 
they might do." 
May we first of all point out that the ·original Agree-
ment contained, am.ong other provisions, Section 103 
(Petitioners' Exhibit" A''): 
''Sec. 103. A joint conference of representatives 
of the Utah Coal Operators signatories hereto and 
of the International Union, United Mine Workers 
of America, shall be held at Salt Lake City, Utah, 
March 24, 1939, to consider what revisions, if any, 
shall be made in this Agreement as to hours, wages 
and conditions of employment. 
'
1
' (a) If a new agreement has not been reached 
on or before the ·expiration ·of this contra-ct, the 
mines covered by this agreement shall -continue in 
operation pending negotiations, or until neg.otia.-
tions are dis.e;ontinued by either party to the 
Agreen1en t. 
'' (b) As long as the mines continue in operation 
after the expiration· of this contract, and until a 
new agreement is rea.ched, the scale of wages, 
rules, regulations and working conditions enumer-
ated herein, slhall remain in full force and effect.'' 
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By the terms of such Agreement Petitioners need not 
have terminated their employment pending negotiations 
-in fact, the Agreement contemplated the reverse situa-
tion. 
The workers substituted the terms of tJhe Interim 
Agreement (Petitioners' Exhibit" B ") which empowered 
the workers to terminate their contractual relationship 
with the coal produeers upon the giving of fifteen days' 
notice. This act alone may readily be considered as one 
of the acts of fomentation by the workers looking toward 
the ealling of a strike. 
However, let us concede for purposes of this argu-
ment that the conditions are purely as stated in the Brief 
of Petitioners. Does the fact that a contract exists, per-
mitting termination of the terms of employment, remove 
workers from the disqualifications provided by Section 
5 (d) f Is a strike any less a strike and a stoppage of 
work any less a stoppage of work because intelligent 
human beings in their written Agreement have foreseen 
their possibility f We think not. 
If the reasoning were followed that a stoppage of 
work brought about by the workers rbecause their contract 
of hire permits them to cease work the provisions of Se~c:­
tion 5 (d) would be evaded. We cannot visualize any 
contract of hire that does not contemplate a power of 
termination. Therefore, we could not visualize, under 
the reasoning urged by the petitioners, any circumstances 
under which the provisions of Section 5 (d) could ever he 
applicable. 
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Let us ·even assume that Petitioners' argument is 
valid, then what would he the result of Section 5(a) of 
tihe Utah law in event the workers determined to cease 
employment~ 
Se·ction 5(a) provides for the disqualification of any 
individual foT benefits: 
'' (a) For the week in which he has left work 
voluntarily without good cause, if so found 1by the 
commission, and for not less than ·one or more 
than the five next following weeks (in addition to 
the waiting period), as determined by the commis-
sion according to the -circumstances in each ~case.'' 
The Petitioners would still be ineligible to receive 
benefits for the period ranging from May 4, 1939, through 
May 18, 1939. They would be ineligible to receive bene-
fits because they vo-luntarily quit work without good 
cause. We do not believe that it would be good 
cause for any worker to quit his joib because he seeks a 
change in his contract of hire unless the conditions of his 
employment ar·e found to be ·extremely undesirable. 
Little ·can he submitted for the guidance of this court 
in the way of adjudicated cases. Not ·only are Unemploy-
ment Compensation laws of very recent origin but the 
question of benefit payments during stri~e periods has 
only very recently arisen and the state laws under which 
such questions may arise are far from uniform. The gen-
eral coal strike her.ein referred to is ·one ·of the first major 
tests of pr·ovisions relating to strik·es. It became the sub-
ject of controversy in the so-.called Appalachian Area; 
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h-owever the cjrcumshule.t•s surrounding- the stoppage of 
work in that Area were extremely different fr{)m the cir-
cumstances existing in Utal1. 
In conclusion we submit that the Decision of the 
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